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Abstract 
This paper represents the first step of a wider research project on the relation between 
the  EU  institutional  settings  and  the  policy  outcome.  We  specifically  tackle  the  CAP 
definition process and the role of the Commission inside consultation procedure, proposing a 
case study on the sugar CMO reform of 2006. Using and adapting the theoretical framework 
proposed by Putnam (1988) we first check the suitability of sugar for such analysis than we 
reconstruct the various phases of the sugar CMO definition process evaluating qualitatively, 
the main issue in discussion, MSs position in relation also to the final outcome and the role 
played by the Commission in this context.  
The analysis is carried out as a documental study in which we collected and evaluate 
the  documents  produced  by  different  bodies  during  the  reform  process  together  with 
interviews with commission internals in order to validate our hypothesis. 
The objective is to point out winners and losers of the reform process, highlighting the 
circumstances in which the Commission could have acted  in order  to compensate losers. 
Moreover,  understand  how  such  compensations  could  have  helped  the  Commission  in 
safeguarding the guidelines for the reform it supports. 
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Introduction 
The  last  ten  years  have  represented  a  period  of  major  changes  for  the  Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). The first elements for a substantial change have been introduced 
with the so called MacSharry reform in 1992. Specifically, a market orientation process of the 
CAP started with the establishment of a partial decoupled aid and a significant reduction of 
the guaranteed prices for the farmers. The core elements of the 1992 intervention found their 
last expression in the guidelines and instrument shaping the Fischler reform in 2003. In this 
occasion the decoupling was extended to a wider range of agricultural products and its nature 
was  deepened,  through  the  complete  decoupling  between  financial  support  and  farmers’ 
choices. Simultaneously the aid has been linked with the compliance of a set of measures 
concerning the environmental sustainability of the whole sector. 
Along  with  the  evolution  of  CAP  policy  instruments,  the  role  of  the  European 
Commission (COM) within the decision making process has been changing too. In order to 
understand  such  a  change,  a  comparison  can  be  made  between  the  so  called  “price 
marathons”,  which  have  characterized  the  negotiations  during  the  first  phase  of  CAP 
evolution, and the negotiations that leaded to MacSharry reform, and particularly to the Mid 
Term Review (MTR). In the first case, the Commission acted as simple mediator between 
MSs Preferences on the level of institutional prices. On the other hand, during the 1992 
reform, and in the definition of the MTR, the COM has been able to propose new schemes of 
intervention  in  agriculture  safeguarding  at  the  same  time  the  core  nature  of  the  reform, 
notwithstanding the difference in MSs Positions and consequent pressures towards a “status 
quo”  solution.  From  this  point  of  view  it  is  likely  that  the  COM  has  developed  several 
instruments to close the gap between its position and the ones express by the MSs, building a 
complex system of side-payments to steer the negotiation to a positive political solution.  
The general aim of our research is to achieve a full understanding of the institutional 
and political conditions allowing the COM to use side-payments as leverage tools to “move” 
MSs  Preferences  towards  an  agreement  in  which  its  preferences  are  encompassed. 
Specifically this paper is devoted to point out, inside a specific legislative procedure, the steps 
and the institutional channels in which the COM can act in order to close the gap between 
MS’s position. In other words, to point out the circumstances in which the Commission first 
takes stock of MSs Preferences (i. e. in bilateral meeting concerning technical aspects) and 
then proposes intermediate compromises in order to “soften” political divergences. 
Understanding  how  the  COM  uses  side  payments  and  manages  the  negotiation  is 
crucial  to  comprehend  in  which  direction  the  recent  and  impending  changes  of  the  EU 
institutional framework can affect COM influence over CAP reform process. On one side the 
last enlargements have multiplied the number of instances the COM has to face to, making the 
negotiation more  complex. On the other, the Reformed Treaty,  if ratified,  will  adopt co-
decision as legislative procedure under which CAP is defined. This will not only modify the   4
formal aspects of the procedure through the entrance of the European Parliament (EP), but 
will also affect the existing system of informal relations and operative solution through which 
the COM exerts its active role. 
The general research project is based on a theoretical background originated by the 
Putnam’s conjectures over the interdependence between domestic politics and international 
agreements (Putnam, 1988). In this framework we insert the peculiar nature of CAP decision 
making in terms of preferences and legislative procedure. We than propose a case study on 
the recently reformed sugar CMO. Through the case study we assess the evolution of the 
relevant issues faced in the different steps of the procedure.  The aim is to draw a framework 
of the institutional channels through which the actors take stock of the respective position and 
evaluate if there is a correspondence between the nature of the issue - if technical or political - 
and the phase of the procedure in which they are faced. Once the institutional framework is 
defined we will evaluate the positions of the various actors involved over the specific issues 
and analyze the changes in the policy shape through the intermediate agreements between the 
COM and the MSs. Finally we will gather the collected data in a formal model assessing 
influence of the COM and specifically the effectiveness of the side-payments according to the 
final policy outcome.  
This paper carries out the first steps of the research project: theoretical framework and 
research question; institutional channels provided by the consultation procedure; relevance 
and fitness of the selected case study according to the research objectives; key issues of the 
negotiation and intermediate agreements along  each phase of the legislative procedure. Thus 
we propose an analysis of the documents produced in the various steps of the procedure by 
the  different  bodies  involved.  For  each  document,  we  report  the  issue  in  object,  the 
correspondent phase of the procedure and the bodies involved in the discussion. The expected 
result of the case study is a clear picture of how and where every specific issue has been 
afforded. At this preliminary stage we will not tackle the specific contents of the documents, 
but only the structure of the negotiation and the main channel of the discussion.  
The study is organized in five sections. In the first section we discuss the theoretical 
background to which we refer in order to interpret the result of the analysis. The third and 
fourth sections are devoted to the discussion of the case study; the documents we analyzed 
and the results we obtained. Finally  we draw some conclusion and we link the achieved 
results to the further research steps. 
 
Theoretical Background 
In this  paragraph we propose  the theoretical background  of  our analysis. First  we 
present  the  general  framework  proposed  by  Putnam  (1988)  for  the  analysis  of  the 
international relations and how this framework could be used to represent the MSs bargaining 
within the CAP context. Subsequently we present the scope of our analysis as an extension of   5
this framework, presenting a bargaining scenario suitable for our analysis. Finally we discuss 
specifically consultation procedure and its effects on the political process.  
 
Putnam’s conjectures and the CAP 
Putnam  (1988) contribution greatly  helped in clarifying  two central aspects of the 
international relations. On the one hand, the role of the entanglements between the domestic 
politics and the international arena, on the other, the development of the win-set definition and 
its application  to the negotiation  for reaching  international agreements. He conceived the 
entanglements  between  international  negotiation  and  domestic  politics  as  a  game  of 
ratification of international treaties, defining level I the international «bargaining between the 
negotiators,  leading  to  a  tentative  agreement»;  and  level  II  as  the  «separate  discussions 
within each group of constituents about whether to ratify the agreement» at domestic level. In 
this framework he defined «the win set for a given level II constituency, as the set of all 
possible  level  I  agreements  that  would  win  when  simply  voted  up  or  down».  In  such  a 
framework,  the  final  agreement  is  possible  only  if  the  actor’s  positions  overlaps  over  a 
determined issue. The size of the win set, and hence the bargaining position, are affected by 
issues operating at the so called level II. The negotiators operating at level I are constrained by 
the domestic implications of the agreement reached inside the international arena, hence, the 
more the domestic positions are “flexible” over the considered issue, the more the negotiator 
will increase its bargaining power.  
Putnam’s contribution seems to provide a valuable theoretical approach to the CAP 
decision making. As explored in detail by Cavallo et al. (2007), the context in which the CAP 
reform process takes place can be effectively described as an interaction between domestic 
interests (level II)  and common concerns (level I). The win-set is characterized by: a) its 
position  along  a hypothetical line ranging from  status quo to “radical reform”  and b) its 
dimension (or size) providing all the potential reforms politically sustainable in the domestic 
arena. From this point of view, the position expressed by the single member state inside the 
Council can be related to a series of characteristic of the agricultural sector in each country. 
The win-set dimension is affected by the economic and social relevance of the agricultural 
sector  in  the  domestic  economy.  The  win-set  position  is  affected  by  the  nature  and  the 
structure  of  the  domestic  agricultural  as  well  as  countervailing  interests.  Finally,  the 
international level (level I) negotiations are affected mainly by two orders of factors. On one 
side, the general political concerns of the national policy makers, such as for example the 
traditional  support/opposition  to  CAP  measures  and  instruments.  On  the  other  side,  the 
institutional and political relationships between each MS and the EU institutions (namely the 
COM  and  the  European  Parliament)  in  terms  of  distances  from  the  proposal  and 
capability/possibility to establish a “preferential” dialogue with the COM.    6
We focus the analysis in this paper on the level I determinants and specifically on how 
a “preferential” dialogue between some MSs and the COM can affect the distribution of the 
bargaining power among MSs. Cavallo et al. (2007) have pointed at the dialogue with the 
COM as one of the main determinants of MS’s bargaining power in the CAP reform process. 
The contribution we propose can be considered as an extension of those results toward a 
better specification of the instruments used by the COM and hence of the effects that the 
COM active role has on shaping the CAP reform process.  
 
Bargaining scenario for the analysis 
The bargaining scenario in which we perform our analysis is rather relevant for the 
characterization of the actor’s respective roles and the impact of their activity on the final 
outcome.  Specifically,  MSs  Positions  and  COM  policy  preferences  have  to  figure  out  a 
bargaining  context  in  which  COM  active  role  is  decisive  for  a  positive  solution  of  the 
legislative  process.  Cavallo et  al.  (2007)  have  described  the  institutional  settings  and  the 
bargaining scenarios in which the COM can perform an active role along the negotiations. In 
such a scenario the MSs Positions tend to be spread and rather distant over the possible policy 
outcome and the COM has to promote a specific solution for the policy in discussion. A 
specific  policy  outcome  might  be  imposed  by  strong  pressures  insisting  over  the  COM 
coming  from  various  sources  such  as:  stakeholders  and  interests  groups,  international 
commitments (i.e. WTO and surroundings), EU budget constraints, consistency with other EU 
policies, etc.  
Figure 1 - CAP bargaining scenario with an active role of the COM and a wide range of position for the MSs 
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The outlined scenario is represented in Figure 1, where the horizontal stripes represent 
the actor’s (MSs and COM) win-sets at level I and the vertical band indicates the sample of 
the feasible potential agreements. In the figure emerges clearly that some MS states win sets, 
namely Italy Spain and France, are out of the range of the final outcomes the COM can accept 
given  its win set.  In such a context it is  likely that  the  COM acts in order  to move the 
positions of the most reluctant MS towards an agreement that encompasses its preferences. 
This is a very simplified but not just an “imaginary” scenario. As stated in the introduction 
the process of definition of the MTR could provide a quite good example. 
In the first stages of the procedure, the CAP reform package proposed by the COM 
founds  the  strong  oppositions  of  some  MSs.  Then  the  negotiation  started  and  the  final 
outcome  of  the  reform  process  safeguarded  the  spirit  of  the  COM  proposal.  During  the 
procedure the COM has been able to steer MSs Positions and preferences keeping unchanged 
at the same time the fundamental structure of the reform. Various factors could have enhanced 
the COM capacity to promote its position, or weakened the MSs ability to defend the status 
quo, but surely the COM played a central role steering the reform within its winset.  
 
Consultation 
Although the political scenario discussed above give some general explanations for the 
active role of the COM, the aims of our analysis impose a more detailed description of the 
institutional opportunities granted to the COM by the legislative procedure involved in CAP-
first  pillar  definition.  In  this  paragraph  we  will  briefly  describe  the  relevant  steps  of 
consultation procedure highlighting for each step in which directions the COM exert an active 
role.  The procedure formally starts with the submission to the Council of an official proposal 
for regulation by the COM. The proposal can be amended by MS and is approved by the 
Council under the qualified majority rule or refused. Once the Council reaches a political 
agreement, the COM together with the Committees is appointed by the Council for managing 
the drafting phase of the applicative regulation and the implementation phase of the new 
measures. This simplified version of the consultation procedure is reported in Figure 2. 
As shown in figure 2 the proposal which the COM submits to the Council is the result 
of a drafting process which begins long before the official submission. Usually the proposal 
drafting starts with a document in which the COM communicates to the other legislative 
partners the purpose of an intervention, the current situation of the sector involved and the 
possible solution for the new legislation. Based on this document a discussion among the 
actors  starts.  The  MS  and  the  stakeholder,  by  various  means,  communicate  with  the 
commission their opinion about the perspective proposal and based on impact studies the 
possible effect of the reform. Although its informal nature the drafting phases of the proposal 
represent a decisive step in which the COM is the centre of a complex net of communications. 
From its privileged position the COM takes stock of the MS and stakeholder positions, and   8
evaluates  the  relative  practicability  of  different solution  together  with  the  strength  of  the 
oppositions.  During this  phase the proposal is reshaped on the base of its feasibility and 
eventually accordingly to intermediate compromises between the COM and the MS. 
Figure 2 - Stylized Consultation procedure with the activity the COM can exert in each phase. 
 
Once the COM submitted the proposal to the Council, opinions from the European 
Parliament  (EP),  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  Committee  of  Regions  are 
required. The role of the EP and the Committees is disregarded in our analysis standing the 
non-binding nature of the amendments and the opinions proposed, although their advices over 
the direction of the reform could be instrumentally used by some of the actors to strength their 
positions.  The  Commission  evaluates  the  amendments  eventually  propose  by  the  EP  and 
consequently modify the proposal which in this new form is submitted to the Council. Here, 
the  controversial  aspects  of  the  proposal  are  taken  into  consideration;  MS  can  propose 
amendments voted under unanimity rule. Before the proposal is discussed and amended by 
the Council, an important work of mediation is developed inside the Special Committee for 
Agriculture (SCA). The SCA is the equivalent for the Coreper, which accomplish the same 
function for all the others EU intervention areas. Inside the SCA the MS interact between 
them and with the COM in order to find political and technical solutions which satisfy the 
wider range of preferences. In fact the outcomes of the SCA are classified in “A points” and 
“B points”. “A points” are directly voted by the Council without any further discussion this   9
means that an agreement, although without any formal vote, has been reached between the 
COM and the representative of the MS. For the “B points” an agreement at a higher level is 
needed thus the separate discussion and vote inside the Council. The COM in this process can 
actively  influence  MS  position  proposing  agreement  and  facilitating  the  discussion.  The 
formal  vote  inside  the  Council  concludes  the  political  process  but  not  the  legislative 
procedure. The regulation drafting and the implementation phase are, by appointment, directly 
under control of the COM. This means that in those phases new compromises are possible and 
also that implicit and in some cases bilateral compromises, eventually settled in the previous 
phases, are made concrete. Of course the nature of such compromises must be technical and 
administrative but they may have facilitated the achievement of a political solution. 
The framework we developed so far tries to give an overall picture of the work of the 
COM  during  the  legislative  procedure.  The  nature  of  the  policy,  the  distribution  of 
preferences and bargaining power between MS and Institutions can affect the channels in 
which  the COM  can  operate.  What  we  wanted to  highlight  here is  that  despite  the  rigid 
framework imposed by the procedure in terms of competences and powers, there is a political 
level of the decision making that the COM can explore in order to influence the outcome 
towards its preferred solution. 
In the remaining of the paper we will analyze these aspects for the case study. First we clarify 
why  sugar  can  be  taken  as  a  good  example  of  bargaining  scenario  than  we  analyze  the 
discussion over specific issues involved in the reform. Finally we draw some intermediate 
conclusion which can serve as a basis for the analytical evaluation of the Commission role.  
 
Case Study: The Sugar CMO reform 
The case study we propose examines the definition of the sugar CMO reform started in 
September 2003 and concluded in June 2006. The motivations of such a choice are related to 
five factors. 
- First, the sugar was not included in the MTR of 2003. This was due to the complex nature of 
the existing CMO and to the uncertainty related to the disputes ongoing in the international 
arena. From the analytical point of view this is rather important, because it allows the clear 
definition of actor’s positions and the evolution of the single issue over the various phases of 
the procedure.  
- Second,  the  positions  expressed  by  the  Member  States  were  rather  distant  both  on  the 
guidelines of the intervention and on the specific issues such as quota reduction, price cuts 
and transitory measures. 
- Third, the Commission position was clear both on the timing and on the issues involved in 
the reform.    10
- Fourth, the relevance of the sector for the commitments that the EU has to fulfill with its 
international partners. Those aspects are considered as constraints, especially over the urgency 
of a reform and on some technical issues as price levels and import/export management. 
- Fifth,  in  relation  to  the  framework  in  which  we  base  analysis,  sugar  reform  represents 
correctly the situation in which the active role of the Commission could be amplified. Actor’s 
positions  are  multifaceted  and  distant:  the  articulation  of  the  sugar  agribusiness  involves 
important  and  differentiated  interests.  Furthermore,  the  Commission  is  concerned  about 
specific  outcomes  of  the  negotiations,  and  moreover  it  is  urged  in  complying  with 
commitments taken in different negotiations contexts.   
    In the next sections we will first analyze the reform process as a whole; for each 
relevant issue we will present the status quo situation, or the starting level for the negotiation, 
and  we  will  evaluate  their  evolution  during  each  phase  of  the  procedure.  Then  we  will 
specifically tackle each issue and the discussion inside each phase in order to evaluate the 
final outcome in the light of the positions expressed by member states and the Commission. 
This will allow us to relate the final outcome to the range of position, pointing out winners 
and losers and identifying also the circumstances in which the Commission could have played 
the role of facilitation/guidance of the negotiation. 
    This preliminary explorative analysis is based on the documents
1 produced from the 
Council and the Commission during each phase of the procedure. We used the status quo, the 
Commission proposals and the Presidency Compromise as bench marks of the sugar CMO 
reform in which the views and the positions expressed by al the partners are synthesized in a 
single outcome. We have also explored the discussion inside the Committees and Working 
Group involved in CAP definition where MSs and Commission representative express their 
positions over each political and technical issues. We completed the analysis with interviews 
and exchanges of opinions with Commissions internals to validate our hypothesis.    
 
The sugar reform: an evolutionary overview 
As stated in the previous section our analysis is composed of two different parts. The 
first one operates at a general level highlighting the differences between the bench marks of 
the  negotiation.  The  second  part  evaluates  MSs  Position  with  respect  to  the  negotiated 
outcome.      
In this subsection we present the evolution of the issues involved in the reform in each 
phase. The sources of information are the Commission introductory document (COM (2004) 
499), the official proposal (COM (2005) 263) for the sugar CMO reform, and the agreement 
reached  inside  the  Council  (Doc.  n°14982/05).  We  report  for  each  aspect  the  status  quo 
situation,  the  proposed  modification  and  the  finally  agreed  outcome.  The  objective  is  to 
                                                
1 A complete list of the consulted documentation is available in appendix 1    11
individuate the main components of the negotiation and answer basic questions such as: how 
much  each  steps  of  the  procedure  differs  from  the  previous  one?  Which  elements  the 
Commission has been able to defend along the procedure? How far the final agreement goes 
is compared to the status quo? Which aspects can be defined as crucial for the Commission? 
In  Table  1  we  have  synthesized  each  issue  in  its  fundamental  components  and  we  have 
highlighted with different colors what has changed between the Commission proposals (in 
blue) and what has been changed or added by the compromise in the Council (in red). 
On a general level we firstly emphasize that for the proposal concerning the sugar 
CMO reform the Commission has considered necessary to produce two distinct documents. In 
the first one - July 2004 - the Commission outlined the general guidelines for the reform, 
indicating  briefly  some  of  the  instruments  for  a  sustainable  policy.  In  June  2005,  the 
Commission submitted a new version of the document which represents the official proposal 
for  a  regulation.  Between  those  documents  almost  a  year  of  intense  discussion  has  been 
conducted. The comparison between them shows important modifications to the instruments 
proposed  in  the  direction  of  a  more  “acceptable”  base  for  further  negotiations.  The 
Commission, thanks to the discussion between the proposals, have “weighted” MSs positions 
and evaluated the most suitable solution in order to satisfy simultaneously its own vision for 
the  future  of  the  sugar  sector  and  the  constraints  imposed  by  MSs  preferences  and  the 
international arena. This behavior has helped the Commission to conduct the wider discussion 
possible individuating the best structure for a widely accepted and effective reform. In greater 
detail, the value of the proposals as negotiation tools emerges clearly considering the options 
for quotas and prices. In the first communication (COM (2004) 499) a combined reduction of 
quotas  and  prices  was  conceived,  mixing  two  of  the  initially  separated  reform  scenarios 
described  in  the  introducing  document  of  2003
2.  Such  a  solution  encompasses  two 
instruments which will result in a double oriented policy. On one side, price reduction stands 
as a market orientation toll in the direction of liberalization. On the other, quotas reductions 
impose stronger constraints to producers, especially for the ones who operate in the most 
productive areas.  
The second information we can derive from the table is the structure of the reform that 
the Commission wanted to propose. The core of the intervention was a mix of instruments 
which aimed in accomplishing two objectives. First reduction of the market surplus in order 
to decrease the budget expenditures and accomplish with the international trade commitments, 
second  mitigation  of  the  negative  effects  of  such  reductions  on  beet  growers  and  sugar 
producers through a set of old ad hoc instruments. 
Institutional price reform was based on the abolition of the intervention price and the 
creation of a reference price for the whole sector. Reference price served as the key price for 
the definition of the minimum price for beet grower, price level which triggers the private 
storage  mechanism  and  the  price  for  border  protection.  Reference  price  reduction  was 
                                                
2 COM(2003) 554   12
conceived  in  three  year  with  a  37%  price  cut.  As  it  concerns  quotas,  the  reduction  was 
planned in four years for a total quota cut 16%.  For market balance tools and restructuring 
scheme the Commission proposed the development of a private storage mechanism, together 
with the possibility to transfer quotas among MSs and the institution of an aid for sugar 
producers  which  withdraws  their  quotas.  The  restructuring  found  was  planned  to  be  co-
financed by the Commission and the MSs. The income reduction for beet growers due to price 
reduction is mitigated by a direct payment which covers the 60% of the loss. No coupled aid, 
even as a transitory measure, was conceived in the Commission proposal.   
 
Table 1 - Resume of the evolution of the issues involved in the sugar CMO reform 
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Starting  from  the  structure  described  so  far,  the  Commission  has  been  able  to 
safeguard only part of the initial proposed reform. Specifically, price restructuring/reduction 
has been object of minor modifications, and many of them introduced by the Commission 
itself. The agreement in the Council adjusted slightly the price cut and introduced a temporary 
maintenance of the intervention price at a level of 60% of the reference. Substantial changes 
with  respect  to  the  2004  proposal  have  been  introduced  by  the  Commission  on:  quotas, 
restructuring fund and amount of payments for beet growers. The Commission cancelled the 
compulsory quota cut, and the possibility for quota transfers among MSs, extending the quota 
system to 2014 instead of 2009. In its official proposal, the Commission established also 
larger and longer subsidies for sugar producers together with a slighter financial contribution   13
by the industry. Finally the Commission increased the envelope for the direct payment of the 
beet growers (+13%).  
The Presidency Compromise amended all those aspects. Specifically, it has introduced 
supplementary quotas for some MSs, increased slightly the aid to the sugar industries and 
introduced a temporary coupled aid for those MSs which voluntarily reduced their quota. 
Major modifications have been introduced by the Council in the restructuring scheme. The 
Council added several important aspects as regional diversification of the aid, aid increasing 
in case of severe quota cuts and a set of compensation for full time refineries and machinery 
suppliers.  
The steps of the sugar reform process provide a clear picture of the different roles 
played by the main UE institutions. The core of the reform has been substantially preserved, 
even if only through the instrument of price reduction no more combined with a compulsory 
quota cut. The Commission itself adjusted substantially the initial proposal by significant 
changes in the key and permanent pillars of the reform: prices, quotas, key parameters of the 
restructuring  fund.    The  Council  introduced  minor  changes  on  prices  and  transitional 
measures concerning the restructuring fund and the payments to the beet growers targeted to 
soften the impact of the reform and accompany the structural adjustment of the whole sugar 
industry. Specifically, the maintenance of a transitional coupled aid and the extension of the 
restructuring fund to refineries and machinery suppliers have reduced the impact of the reform 
on the industry profitability and retained a certain digressive level of protection for few years. 
Such additional measures are all temporary and did not prevent the overall objectives of the 
reform which consist in extending the decoupled scheme to new CMOs and reducing the gap 
between the domestic and the world market. From this point of view the final agreement did 
not go too far from the Commission proposal in either a conservative or a reforming direction. 
Such  a  picture  suggests  that  most  of  the  main  negotiations  among  MSs  occurred 
between the first and the second proposal with the strategic management of the Commission. 
The multidimensional nature of the reform made available several technical and technical-
political arguments to the Commission to drive MSs with radically different positions toward 
a sustainable compromise, which is not so far, at least in the key issues, from the original 
ideas of the Commission about the sugar reform.     
 
The Sugar Reform:  winner, losers and the role of the European Commission 
In this subsection we will evaluate MSs Position with respect to the agreed outcome. 
The  objective  is  to  point  out  winners  and  losers  of  the  reform  process,  highlighting  the 
circumstances  in  which  the  Commission  has  acted  in  order  to  compensate  losers  MSs. 
Moreover,  we  aim  at  understanding  how  such  compensations  could  have  helped  the 
Commission in safeguarding the guidelines of the reform it supports.   14
 Although  we  recognize  the  importance  of  the  stakeholder  pressures  in  the  EU 
decision  making,  and  particularly  on  sugar  sector,  the  effects  of  such  pressures  on  MSs 
Positions are disregarded for the moment. This is related to the preliminary and explorative 
nature of our case study which is not affected in its results by such a simplification. Referring 
to Putnam’s framework, in this analysis we are only considering inside level one the specific 
role of each actor, specifically on the Commission’s role and activity.   
Our analysis starts from the decomposition of the negotiation in 3 fundamental phases 
of discussion. First we have analyzed the pre-proposal discussions in which, from the options 
presented by the Commission in the document COM (2003) 544, MSs have raised questions 
and remarks revealing their preferences. Secondly we have examined the discussion between 
the  proposals  evaluating  MSs  Positions  with  respect  to  the  instruments  raised  by  the 
Commission to figure out the sugar reform. Finally we have evaluated the regulation agreed 
in the Council pointing out which MSs can be considered winners and losers.  We have 
finally  summarized  the  results  obtained  by  the  documental  research,  pointing  out  which 
aspects of the agreed reform can be considered as side payments for the losers. 
 
Pre-Proposal phase:  Revealing MSs Preferences 
  Before the submission of the first Commission proposal an important discussion on the 
base  of  the  document  COM  (2003)  544  has  been  developed.  In  the  cited  document,  the 
Commission  proposed  three  options  for  a  new  asset  of  the  sugar  CMO,  together  with  a 
detailed impact assessment. The three options are summarized in Table 2.  In this phase MSs 
have raised general questions and preliminary evaluations of the instruments raised by the 
Commission. The discussion can be divided in two main parts. On one side, the preliminary 
responses to the options proposed, on the other the concern raised by the Commission about 
the timing of the reform.  
 
Table 2: Options for Sugar Reform. 
Options 
Source: Doc n° 13843/03 - 14327/03 - 14634/03
Quota Retention and little price rdeduction
Price reduction with no quotas
Liberalization: No price set by EU,            
quota abolition.
 
  As stated above, the questions raised and the opinions on the options remain on a 
general level. The provisional nature of the position expressed by MSs does not prevent a 
preliminary classification of the Countries into groups supporting each option. In Table 3 we   15
have summarized the three options, the MSs supporting each option and the specific remarks 
justifying their support. A more detailed situation can be outlined for the timing of the reform, 
in the Table 4 we present the main concerns of the Commission about the timing, the position 
assumed by MSs and their remarks. 
 
Table 3: MSs Support to the options proposed for a sugar reform. 
Commission options
Quota retention and little price rdeduction
Price reduction with no quotas
Liberalization
Mainteinance of the current production                                                                   
Opening EU market  (EBA, ACP).
Considered the most politically realistic. 
MSs Remarks
Other options not sufficently far reaching






   
From the data collected it emerge a situation in which the most competitive countries 
support an intervention even if through different instruments. This is shown in Table 1 where 
Romania  and  UK  are  in  favor  of  a  quota  reduction.  Netherland  and  Germany  are  more 
“attracted” by a price reduction with quota abolition. In this context we found no southern 
European Countries in favor of any of the reform options. This emerges clearly if we read the 
two tables in parallel. In table 4 Greece, Spain and Italy conceives the reform too early if 
compared with the situation of the sugar market. On the opposite, the front which agrees with 
the Commission timing is composed by all the MSs which support at least one option for the 
reform. 
 
Table 4: Positions of the MSs on the Commission’s timing concerns. 
1 - Not in favour of waiting the end of the 
regime in 2006 to set up a reform. 
2 - Expiry of the WTO peace clause in  Dec. 
2003.  
3 - Outcome of the WTO panel.  
4 - Need for anticipating the impact of 
supplies from LDC's and the Balkans.
MSs Reaction
Welcomed the discussion on the sugar reform 
The discussion and a provisional reform are too 
early coincieved,
Source: Doc n° 13843/03 - 14327/03 - 14634/03
Reform Timing Concerns MSs




  We  can  now  summarize  the  information  obtained  using  the theoretical  framework 
developed above. We can thus use the concept of win-set to depict the scenario of the pre 
proposal stage. We divided MSs in four groups, and derived their position starting from the   16
Commission’s options which has been used as a “proxy” of its position in the early stage of 
the negotiation.  
Figure 3 - Positions of the MSs after before the first Commission's proposal 
 






Minimum for MTR accomplishment
Too early for a deep reform
Limit the ireformto the minimun                     
(option 1)
















Source: Doc. n° 10428/04 
More in dept, MSs gathered in group 1 are all against the proposed intervention and 
their main concerns are related to the continuation of the production of sugar in certain areas. 
Group 2, which prefers option 1, is in favor of a “soft” reform especially in terms of price and 
quota cuts, which has to be the minimum possible to accomplish the strict requirements of 
consistency with the MTR. The Commission position ranges from  the  “minimum for the 
MTR accomplishment” and the most radical reform options, liberalization. In this range the 
Commission will structure its proposal encompassing the highest range of positions possible 
under  the  constraint  of  a  minimum  level  of  reform.  Indicatively  the  suitable  proposal  is 
represented by the vertical band.  
The MSs and Commission positions set-up shown in figure 3 represent the starting 
point in which insert the first Commission proposal and the discussion which conducted to the 
official  regulation  proposal  of  the  June  2005.  In  the  next  paragraph  we  will  analyze  the 
discussion  over  the  Commission  first  proposal  pointing  out  MSs  reactions  to  the  reform 
instruments proposed and the actions undertaken by the Commission in order to safeguard the 
guidelines and instrument it proposed.   17
 
Between the proposals  
The discussion between the Commission proposals reveals important elements. First, 
the concerns and preferences of the Commission are clarified. Second, MSs expressed their 
position more specifically. Third the value of the first proposal as a negotiation tool emerges 
and is specifically related to MSs Position.  
As  it  concerns  the  guidelines,  the  Commission  stated  clearly  in  the  document 
n°15445/04 which factors it consider crucial in sugar reform - summarized in Table 4. These 
factors  are  matter  of  discussion  between  MSs  which  expressed  their  preferences.  We 
summarized such a scenario in Table 5. 
 




Source Doc n° 15445/04,  12672/04, 12672/04 ADD1 ADD2
The regime for sugar should 
be in line with the MTR 
and the EU must fufill 
specific requirements in the 
international arena
Institutional support price 
reduction, abolition of the 
intervention, creation of a 
reference price
Minimum price for beet 
growers derived from the 
reference price
Partial compensation (60%) 
to beet growers in the form 
of a decoupled aid
Reduction of the EU 
quotas and merging A and 
B sugar into one quota. 
Traferibility of quotas 
among MSs
Reform should be 
reviewed in 2008 after 




From the tables emerges how the Commission proposed a reform which mixes the 
options presented in the early stages of the procedure. The combined quota and price cuts are 
coupled with direct payments to beet growers and the establishment of a restructuring fund 
sustaining the transformers.   
MSs reacted to such a mixed solution differently. On one side the more competitive 
MSs in sugar production supported the proposal, even if some of them raised concerns about 
possible  negative  effects  and  applicability.  Mediterranean  MSs  are  on  the  contrary  quite 
compact in opposing the intervention which is judged too early and unbalanced in its effects, 
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Table 5 – MSs reactions to Commission Guidelines 
MSs Reactions MSs
In line with the reform proposed concerned about 
timing. Possible negative effect should be carefully 
considered
Germany, France, UK 
Raised serious reservation.                                             
The proposed reform is too far reaching and unbalanced 
among MSs. Concentration of production could result 
from the reform in contrast with the Lisbon strategy. 
Agree in broad principles but expressed concerns in the 
conrete applicabilty of some of the proposed mechanism
Austria, Hungary, Netherlands, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Belgium
Denmark
In favour of a more radical reform, towards a fully 
libelized sugar market
Italy, Spain, Finland, Greece
Source Doc n° 15445/04,  12672/04, 12672/04 ADD1 ADD2  
 
Reactions  to  specific  instruments  are  summarized  in  tables  6  and  7.  Due  to  the 
complexity  of  the  positions  expressed  we  isolated  the  reaction  of  the  MSs  to  the  direct 
payment for beet growers. 
 
Table 6 - MSs Positions between the Commission proposals – Specific Issues. 
Oppose
MSs Position











Support Germany, Denmark, France





Minimum price for beet growers
Quotas
Price reduction
Reference price (400/450 €/t)
Conversion scheme Oppose
Increase of isoglucose quota
Commission Proposal
Support
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Table 7 - MSs Positions between the Commission proposals – Direct Payments. 
Finland, France, Italy, Greece, Spain, 
Netherland
Support
Poland, Austria, Finland, Spain, Italy
Finland, Italy, Hungary
None Explicitly
Source Doc n° 12672/04, 12672/04 ADD1 ADD2
Commmission Proposal MSs position MSs
Denmark, Germany, Belgium
Oppose




Regionalization of the aid
Denmark, Germany, Belgium
Lower level of Compensation





MSs  supporting  the  guidelines  of  the  reform  are  also  in  favor  of  the  relative 
instruments, with some exceptions. Is this the case of the Netherlands which supports the 
reform guideline but at the same time asks for an adjustments of the instruments proposed. 
Specifically it claims for price cut reduction and the increasing of the income percentage 
covered by the direct payments. The separation between northern and southern Countries 
applies  also  to  the  instruments.  In  such  a  scenario  the  Commission  presents  it  official 
proposal.  
The modifications that the Commission introduced to the first proposal are important 
if compared to the positions expressed by MSs during the discussion. In fact, the work done in 
this phase can be related to the necessity of gathering together the highest number of MSs in 
support its view over the sugar reform. Specifically, the Commission abandoned one of the 
most  opposed  instruments,  namely  the  compulsory  quota  cut,  simultaneously  has  better 
specified the restructuring fund in terms of aid and funding and has welcomed the call for a 
softer price cut coming from a number of MSs.  
Commission behavior can be explained through a strategic view. The Commission 
wants to prevent opposing MSs to form a blocking minority inside the Council, which will 
jeopardize the core elements of the reform together with its timing. Thus the Commission 
acted in the phase of the procedures it controls, the elaboration of the proposal, in order to 
understand  MSs  Position  and  find  the  widely  accepted  compromise  possible  which 
encompasses Commission concerns and preferences.  In other words and related to Figure 2, 
the Commission acted in order to gather together Groups 2 and 3 of MSs which were not 
against the principles of the reform, reshaping the proposed instruments in order to build an 
“acceptable”  base  of  negotiation  given  the  weight  of  MSs  position.  In  this  way  the 
Commission has exerted its active role not on the extreme MSs Positions but on the closest   20
MSs to its view building a solid base over which the Council can compose an agreement not 
to far from the proposal. 
In the next section we will briefly remind the changes introduced to the proposal by 
the Presidency Compromise of the November 2005 and show how it respond essentially to the 
specific position of the “more status quo oriented” Countries not affecting the nature of the 
Commission proposal.  
 
Presidency Compromise 
Three measures have been added to the Commission proposal in the direction of the 
more conservative approach, but both of them are temporary and not affecting the structure of 
the sugar market for the future. First, beet growers payment has been added with a coupled 
component which covers the 30% if the income loss in addition to the 60% covered by the 
decoupled aid. This is a temporary measure lasting until 2014.  
Second, in a transitory period of eight years and for the MSs who suffer a severe quota 
reduction is conceded the possibility to give national coupled aid to the sector. Those national 
measures have to be authorized by the European Union.   
Third the complex of measures in favor of the stabilization of the EU sugar sector after 
the reform as the one in favor of the machinery suppliers and the full time refineries and 
increasing in the supplementary quota for some MS.  
The point we want to highlight is that the reform passed practically unchanged in the 
Council, if we except some transitional adjustments outlined in the previous paragraph. This 
is related to the intense discussion conducted in the earlier phases which facilitated mutual 
understanding between the Commission and the Countries more in favor of a reform. At the 
same time, the Commission seemed to be reluctant to propose in the intermediate stage of the 
procedure measures which pose strong financial pressure on the EU budget, leaving in some 
way such a decision to the intergovernmental bargaining in the Council. The attention to such 
an aspect could have even more strengthened the Commission proposal and augmented the 
possibilities to see it accepted.  
 
Conclusive Remarks 
  In relation to the starting questions of the research project and to the specific ones 
tackled in the paper we can derive some interesting insights from this analysis.  
First of all the theoretical question we raised sounds very useful in clarifying the bargaining 
situation in which we developed our analysis, not only for general and political issues but also 
in  the  evaluation  of  the  modification  of  technical  instruments.  From  this  point  of  view 
Putnam’s approach can serve as an important tool in the analytical and quantitative analysis 
which will develop in the second part of the research project.    21
Second the choice of sugar as case study to test our hypothesis about Commission role 
in the EU decision making proved to be really effective for the variety of issues involved, the 
complexity  of  certain  aspects,  the  relevance  of  the  theme  for  EU  institution  and  the 
stakeholders relevance in the sector.  
As it concerns the relation between the nature of the issues in discussion (technical or 
political) and the phase of the procedure in which they are tackled, we noticed that in each 
phase of the procedure all the issues are covered. The Commission proposal is considered as 
“unique piece of legislation” which contains many instruments, these instruments and/or their 
magnitude form the base for the intermediates and final compromises which characterize the 
development the EU decision making process. 
The results of the analysis, even if with preliminary and incomplete, that in we showed 
that in the case of sugar the main activity of the Commission has been developed in the 
definition  of  the  proposal.  We  can  thus  identify  this  step  of  the  procedure  as  the  main 
institutional channel inside consultation procedure in which the Commission can exert its 
active role in the political process which runs in parallel with the procedural and technical 
one.  
  Going more in dept in the sugar case study MSs can be divided into 3 main groups. 
Two of them, namely group 2 and 3 are in favor of an intervention, whilst group one raised 
serious reservation about the proposed reform. The first two groups’ positions are close to the 
Commission  proposal  and  also  the  ones  who  get  a  reform  which  encompasses  their 
preferences. Group one has to accept the reform and try to find some sort of compensation 
inside the Council. The Commission played a relevant role of coordination in the specific case 
accurately shaping the legislative proposal in order to gather around it the highest number of 
MSs. With this operation the Commission, in the case of sugar, succeeded in safeguarding the 
concern and views expressed in the early stage of the procedure.  
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